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Introduction
Vega-Redondo (1997b) has shown in his well-known paper “The Evolution
of Walrasian behavior” that imitation in a simple Cournot Game leads to
competitive prices which are also known as Walrasian prices. The intuition
behind this is quite simple: As every firm is confronted with the same price1,
the firm which offers the highest quantity will also realize the highest profit.
Therefore, every other firm will imitate the quantity of that respective firm
which consequently leads to a higher quantity overall, hence the prices will
decrease. This imitation dynamic (with mutations) proceeds until the Wal-
rasian price is reached.
We will also focus on imitation behavior of economic agents throughout
this study. One of the most important advantages of imitation of the most
successful agent is, that it is a very simple decision rule which only requires
the knowledge of the action and the success of the other agents as informa-
tion pool. In complex environments imitation could be the only plausible
and available decision rule. Not only is imitation an essential mechanism2 in
nature but also a lot of human decisions can be traced back to it. Economic
markets can likewise constitute similarly complex environments in which im-
itation can be used as decision rule or at least as a rule of thumb. In Duersch,
Oechssler & Schipper (2010) it is shown that imitation of the best is an ‘un-
beatable’3 decision heuristic. In that paper the authors mean by unbeatable
that the imitation behavior of the agents can not be exploited by an agent
who is aware of the fact that the others are imitating.
Vega-Redondo used the graph theoretic technique introduced by Freidlin
& Wentzell (1984) which was established as a solution concept for games in
1We assume here that the price is higher than the costs of producing one good, but in
the other case the dynamics would also lead to the same price.
2An example would be replication in the evolution process.
3For this to become valid some assumptions have to be fulfilled, symmetry of the players
for example.
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economics by Kandori, Mailath & Rob (1993) 4. This approach uses a Markov
Chain to represent the dynamic process. Further, it introduces mutations5
into the dynamics in order to be able to determine Long Run Equilibria. We
will use this dynamical approach as well to determine the Long Run Equilibria
in the Markov Chain with ‘imitating the best’ dynamics. We will call these
Long Run Equilibria in such dynamics Imitation Equilibria, thus we use a
different definition for the term Imitation Equilibrium as it has been used by
Selten & Ostmann (2001).
Instead of the Cournot Game it will be the Hotelling Game6 we are going
to use in our study. In this game two firms are exposed to a price competition.
The firms will use imitation as a price setting rule, so they will simply set
the price of the firm, that had the highest profit in the previous round. As
mentioned in Apesteguia, Huck & Oechssler (2007)7 imitation of one’s own
opponents leads to more competitive outcomes than the Nash Equilibrium,
thus we are also getting more competitive prices in our setting. However
we are not observing marginal-cost prices which are obtained as Imitation
Equilibrium in the Cournot Game by Vega-Redondo. We show that the
Imitation Equilibrium in the Hotelling Game will be exactly the mean of the
marginal-cost price and the Nash Equilibrium price.
Selten & Apesteguia (2005) have taken a similar approach for price com-
petition on the circle. In their analysis they are focusing on experimental
results. By these means they are trying to get some empirical evidence of
imitation behavior of the involved individuals. Ultimately, they stress that
”imitation is clearly present in the behavior of those subjects”8, which empir-
ically strengthens the need to investigate more on the economic implications
of imitation.
In Alo´s-Ferrer & Ania (2005) symmetric aggregate games have been in-
vestigated. The Hotelling Game represents such a game. Therefore, we can
and will use some of the results of this paper, in particular the link between
Evolutionary Stable Strategies and the Imitation Equilibrium.
In the first chapter we will introduce the Hotelling Game with the usually
associated assumptions and calculate the basic characteristics (like the Nash
Equilibrium) of that game. These results will be used later on as a benchmark
4Young (1993) is another famous economic application of this approach. Also, Ellison
(1993) should be mentioned for applying it on Local Interactions.
5Here mutation is referred to random selection of actions which occurs with a small
probability.
6Definition can be found in Tirole (1988, 2.1.2), original in Hotelling (1929)
7As Vega-Redondo they analyzed games in the Cournot setting.
8Selten & Apesteguia (2005, p. 185)
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for the imitation results.
Subsequently, in the second chapter, we will analyze the impact of the
agents’ imitation behavior on the equilibrium. Hence, we will justify imita-
tion as a decision rule as well as briefly present the Freidlin and Wentzell
approach to model imitation behavior and calculate the unique Imitation
Equilibrium in the introduced simple model. At the end of this chapter we
will briefly describe Relative Payoff Maximization as another possible ap-
proach to determine the Imitation Equilibrium directly.
In the third chapter we will loosen up some of the assumptions made in
chapter 1 and calculate the Imitation Equilibria in these modified models.
On the one hand we will alter the rigorous cost structure of the simple model.
Among other modifications we will introduce asymmetric marginal costs as
well as fixed costs. On the other hand we will modify the distribution of the
costumers. Thereby we will see that some basic assumptions are required to
obtain a unique Imitation Equilibrium.
In the ultimate part of the thesis we will finally illustrate the obtained re-
sults by simulating the game and illustrating the probability distributions. In
this process we will also focus on the convergence of the Imitation Equilibria
in respect to the mutation rate and the price grid size.
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Chapter 1
Simple Model
We start by introducing a first simple model. We will give different economic
interpretations of the game and calculate the Nash Equilibrium and the re-
sulting profits. These results will serve us later on as benchmarks for the
Imitation Equilibrium.
1.1 The Model
As our basic game we will use a simplified version of the Hotelling Game.
This game was introduced by Hotelling (1929)1.
We chose the Hotelling Game as underlying game, because this game
equips the economic agents in the Bertrand Game with some market power.
Such circumstances let this model represent real world markets better than
the pure Bertand Game while still being mathematically easily manageable.
In the Hotelling Game there are two firms I := {1, 2} which represent the
players (firms) of the game. The two firms are living in a one-dimensional
space, the unit interval. Each firm is located at one end of this unit inter-
val. Contrary the usually made assumption on movements we do not allow
movements in our model.
1Hotelling has interestingly shown among other results that “an undue tendency for
competitors to imitate each other in quality of goods, in location, and in other essential
ways”(Hotelling (1929, p. 41)) exists. We want to stress that the sort of imitation men-
tioned by the author is different to our imitation approach. The imitation mentioned by
Hotelling is a result of rational behavior in the Hotelling Game whereas we use imitation as
an ‘irrational’ behavioral approach (only irrational if there are no information constraints)
for solving games.
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1.1.1 Consumer distribution
z
f(z)
distribution consumers
Firm 1 Firm 2
0 1
1
Figure 1.1: Distribution in the simple model
In the model there are infinitely many consumers who are uniformly dis-
tributed on the unit interval (figure 1.1). This uniform distribution can be
formalized as a probability density function f(x) (x denotes the location at
the unit interval) defined as:
f(x) =
{
1 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
0 else
F (x) will denote the cumulative distribution function of the density func-
tion f(x), which is defined by F (x) :=
∫ x
−∞ f(t)dt.
1.1.2 Costs
Production Costs
Both firms produce identical goods. In the simple model we assume that
both firms do not have fixed costs f1 = f2 = 0. Furthermore, the two firms
have identical positive constant marginal costs c1 = c2 = c ∈ R+. These
assumptions about the cost structure will also be loosened up in chapter 3.
Transport Costs
The consumers have unit demand which means they buy exactly one of the
two produced goods. For buying the good each consumer has to travel on
the unit interval to the firm and buy it there. Traveling causes the consumer
transport costs t(d) which depend on the distance d between the location of
the consumer to the firm. Let us assume that the transport costs are linear
in respect to the distance, so tc(d) = td, where t ∈ R++ denotes the costs of
traveling one unit (from one end to the other of the unit interval).
7
Product Differentiation
There is also another interpretation2 of the ‘transport’ costs which the con-
sumers have to bear and are dependent on the location of the consumer.
We could assume that the firms do not offer exactly the same good. Since
the consumers have different tastes the firms horizontally differentiate3 their
products to address certain fractions of the consumers. In this interpretation
the unit interval in the model represents the possible product space. Hence
the products of the firms and not the firms themselves are now located on the
ends of the unit interval. The position of the consumer represents the ideal
product for the consumer. The distance between the position of the consumer
and the offered products by the firms can now be interpreted as difference
between the desired, optimal good of the consumer and the properties of the
actual offered goods by the firms.
z
p(z)
p1(z)p2(z)
min(p1(z), p2(z)) = p(z)
Firm 1 Firm 2
p1 = p(0)
p2 = p(1)
s1 s2
Figure 1.2: The market shares of two firms with given prices
1.1.3 Market Share and Profit
Each firm i sets a price pi for the product. The consumers will buy the
product from the firm which offers the cheaper price including the transport
costs to get there and buy the good.
2See Mas-Colell, Whinston & Green (1995, 12) or Tirole (1988, 2.1.2), also in the
original paper Hotelling (1929)
3Vertical differentiation would imply that the consumers agree on a preference order
over the products.
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Market Share
Due to the linear transport costs the consumers on the unit interval get
partitioned in two connected areas. Every consumer in an area buys the
good at the same firm. These areas can therefore be seen as the market
shares of the firms. We will denote the market share by si for firm i. Figure
1.2 provides a simple example of possible market shares. In the case in
which the prices of both firms differ more than the transport cost for one
unit (mathematically |pi − pj| > t) the length of the area and hence the
market share of the firm with the higher price would be zero whereas the
area of the other firm would be the whole unit interval.
Formally we can introduce a market share function which depends on
both prices and is defined as follows:
si(pi, pj) =

0 if pi − pj > t
1 if pj − pi > t
pj+t−pi
2t
else
(1.1)
This market share function can be derived by calculating the intersection
of the two firms’ price lines (depicted also in figure 1.2). The equation of the
price lines are simply: p = pi +xt and p = pj + (1−x)t. As we are assuming
that t > 0 and t ∈ R there must exist an intersection point of these two price
lines. This intersection point can lie outside of the unit interval. In this case
a function that is not piecewise defined would return a value higher than 1
or less than 0. Therefore we have to use a piecewise definition for the market
share function.
Profit
The profit can be calculated as the marginal profit for each consumer times
the amount of consumers that are buying the product. Since we have in-
finitely many consumers we can not use the amount of consumers. Therefore
we have to use the integral over all buying consumers:
pii(pi, pj) =
1∫
0
(pi − c)1{pi+xt<pj+(1−x)t}dF (x) (1.2)
The integral only integrates over a connected area, thus this expression
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can be simplified by using the introduced market share function si(pi, pj):
pii(pi, pj) =
si(pi,pj)∫
0
(pi − c)dF (x) (1.3)
A further step of simplification can be achieved because of the trivial
form of the used consumer distribution in the model. On the unit interval
the cumulative distribution function is simply the identity.
pii(pi, pj) =
si(pi,pj)∫
0
(pi − c)dx = (pi − c)si(pi, pj)
So the profit of firm i is simply the market share si times the marginal
profit of the firm. Substituting si(pi, pj) with (1.1) leads to:
pii(pi, pj) =
1
2t
(pi − c)(pj + t− pi) (1.4)
We have to keep in mind that we do not list the piecewise definition of the
market share function here, so this profit formula only holds for |pi−pj| ≤ t.
If |pi − pj| > t holds the profit of the firm with the lower price would be
simply (pi− c) and the profit of the firm with the higher price would be zero.
1.2 Nash Equilibrium
If both firms are fully informed about the game4, believe in common ratio-
nality, and want to maximize the own profit the Nash Equilibrium would be
the appropriate solution concept to predict the actions of the firms. As a
benchmark we first consider the Nash Equilibrium of the game.
To obtain the Nash Equilibrium we will first calculate the best response
functions of the firms. Each firm maximizes the profit by setting the price
(profit maximizing price) depending on the other firm’s price:
argmax
pi
pii(pi, pj) = argmax
pi
1
2t
(pi − c)(pj + t− pi)
4This includes the own and the other firm’s cost structure as well as the consumer
decision rule.
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To get the best response functions we calculate the derivative of the profit
function of firm i with respect to the own price:
dpii(pi, pj)
dpi
=
1
2t
(pj − 2pi + c+ t)
Setting this expression to zero we obtain the best response function.5
0 =
1
2t
(pj − 2pi + c+ t)
We get the following best response functions for both firms. We do not
have to calculate the best response function of the second firm separately
because the game is symmetric.
p1(p2) =
p2 + c+ t
2
p2(p1) =
p1 + c+ t
2
(1.5)
Using both formula in 1.5 we obtain by solving them for the prices the
symmetric Nash Equilibrium price(s):
pi = t+ c ∀i ∈ I (1.6)
Note that also this is the only Nash Equilibrium if the price differences
are higher than the transport costs (|pi − pj| > t).6
We observe that the firms set the prices in the Nash Equilibrium above
the marginal costs. Due to the transport costs the firms gain some market
power and therefore can set the prices higher than in the pure Bertrand
Game. Such prices imply positive profits:
pii(pi, pj) =
1
2t
(pi − c)(pj + t− pi)
with pi = pj = t+ c
pii =
1
2
t
These obtained results will serve as benchmarks for the Imitation Equi-
librium in the following chapters.
5The second derivative leads to − 2t which is strict negative because we have assumed
strict positive transport costs. So the profit function is concave and therefore we getting
the maximizer by setting the first derivative to zero.
6Since we have only considered price differences less or equal the transport costs (|pi−
pj | ≤ t) in the analysis, we could have created an artificial equilibrium or lost one by
considering only such price differences.
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Chapter 2
Imitation Equilibrium
The informational requirements for the players to be able to obtain the Nash
Equilibrium are quite strict. In this solution concept the players need to know
the whole structure of the game (for example the cost structure of the other
firm) as well as they have to believe in common rationality. In real life situ-
ations, the structure of games in which firms interact is highly sophisticated
and complex. The firms usually do not even know the exact consumers’ de-
cision rules or the influence of their price decision on the environment. Thus,
the informational requirements to obtain the Nash Equilibrium might not be
fulfilled and therefore we should also consider other equilibrium concepts.
As already mentioned in the introduction, imitation is a plausible and
simple decision rule. A decision rule based on imitation would be for example:
“I will set the price of the firm which made the highest profit in the last
period”. The informational requirements for such a decision rule are much
lower. Only the profits and the prices have to be known by both firms.
Additionally, to intuitively imitate the behavior of the firm with the greatest
success appears to be a straight decision rule for success.
Also, as mentioned in Vega-Redondo (1997b) “this rule seems intuitively
appealing if the decision makers are rewarded according to their relative
performance”, which is another motivation for the decision maker to imitate1.
For a symmetric game like our model these arguments are getting even
stronger. Therefore, we will formalize imitation behavior in this chapter and
subsequently calculate the resulting Imitation Equilibrium.
Note that the Imitation Equilibrium is a dynamical approach whereas
1As we will see later on, Relative Payoff Maximization and imitation behavior are
closely connected.
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the Nash Equilibrium concept is a statical one. Thus, we have to extend the
model described in section 1.1.
2.1 Extensions to the model
First, we have to introduce periods in which the imitation dynamic will be
embedded. In our approach we will use discrete time and periods will be
indexed by t ∈ N0. In each round both firms set their prices, hence the
process has at the period t the state ω(t) = (p1(t), p2(t)). Due to technical
considerations we assume that both firms can only set prices that are in the
finite grid Γ = {0, δ, 2δ, . . . , γδ}, where γ ∈ N and δ ∈ R++.
With these assumptions on the prices we will have a finite state space in
the Markov chain which allows us to use a less complicated technical pro-
cedure for analyzing the long run behavior. It will additionally be assumed
that the resulting imitation equilibrium price is an element of the price grid
Γ. However, these assumptions do not establish strong restrictions because
the price grid Γ can be arbitrarily fine due to the parameters δ and γ.
With pi(t) = (pi1(t), pi2(t)) we will denote the profit profile in period t.
The profit of player i in round t can be formalized as (see equation 1.4):
pii(t) =
1
2t
(pi(t)− c)(pj(t) + t− pi(t))
This profit profile in period t can be directly calculated from the price
profile in the same period.
Revision probability Now let us assume that with a certain probability
(independent in respect to time and players) w > 0 a firm is allowed to
set another price in the next round. This probability w is called revision
probability.
“Imitation of the best” dynamics If the firm receives a revision oppor-
tunity, the firm sets the price of the firm which made the highest profit. In
addition we assume that the firm randomly chooses a price (the own price
or the price of the other) if both firms have the same profit (random tie
breaking). The probability distribution over these both prices is irrelevant;
it is only important that the probability of setting each of these two prices
is strictly positive.
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2.2 Process as a Markov chain
The described process can be modeled as a discrete-time Markov chain2
because future state(s) of the process depend only on the current state. In
this as well as the next subsection, we will provide a brief and basic, but far
from being complete, introduction to Markov chains, so that readers without
basic knowledge in stochastic processes can follow the analysis.
A Markov chain is a random process that has no memory which means
that the next state in the next period only depends on the current state. The
state space of our process is given by Ω = Γ×Γ = Γ2 and is thus the set of all
possible price combinations of the two firms. As we have assumed, a finite
price grid of the resulting whole state space is also finite. The transition
matrix of a Markov chain, denoted for this process by P 0 (we are using the
superscript 0 because we want to differentiate this unperturbed process from
the perturbed one P  which will be introduced later), depicts the probabilities
to move between two states. Therefore, the element
pij = P
(
ω(t+ 1) = j | ω(t) = i)
of the matrix P 0 is the probability to move from state i to state j (i, j ∈ Ω) in
one period. The probability to reach the state j from the state i in n periods
is denoted by p
(n)
ij . This probability can be calculated by multiplication of
the transition matrix. So p
(n)
ij is the i, j element of the matrix P
n.
Communication classes Every state space of Markov chains can be par-
titioned in communication classes Ck, k = 1, 2, . . . , l. The condition for states
being in the same communication class is that they can communicate with
each other. Communicating in this context means that there is a positive
probability to reach one state from the other state and vice versa. In math-
ematical terms:
∀k,∀i, j ∈ Ck, i 6= j,∃n,m ∈ N so that p(n)ij > 0 and p(m)ji > 0
Closed communication classes A communication class Ck is closed if
there is no way out of it. In other words: If the process enters in a closed
communication class, it will remain forever in that class. More formally:
∀i ∈ Ck,∀j /∈ Ck,∀n ∈ N holds p(n)ij = 0
2see Chapter 1 of Norris (1997)
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A communication class which consists only of one state is called a sin-
gleton. Another definition which we will use in the following proposition are
monomorphic states. A monomorphic state is a price profile which has the
same price for all firms.
2.3 Unperturbed Process
2.3.1 Closed Communication Classes
Proposition 1. In the specified model all closed communication classes are
singletons and monomorphic states.
Proof. Clearly, each monomorphic state is absorbing. This is trivial because
if both firms have the same profit, the firm(s) which get(s) a revision oppor-
tunity will not change its price, as imitation of the other firms’ price leads
to the same price and thus to the same price profile.
Furthermore, all other singletons are not absorbing: First, if the firms
have different profits, the state is clearly not absorbing. In such a state the
firm with the lower profit will adapt (with probability w) the price of the
other firm. If the firms had exactly the same profit but different prices, 3
this singleton would also not be absorbing as there is a positive probability
to leave that state. To leave this state can for example be achieved by a
revision opportunity of one firm and the possibility of choosing the price of
the other firm (random tie breaking).
It is also trivial to see that all closed communication classes have to be
singletons. Due to the fact that the Markov chain can reach an absorbing
monomorphic state from every non-monomorphic state, a non-monomorphic
state can never be part of a closed communication class. It is also clear
that an absorbing communication class can never contain more than one
monomorphic state, since monomorphic states do not communicate with each
other, meaning there is no opportunity to reach one monomorphic state from
another monomorphic state.
Every Markov process will finally end up in a closed communication class.
This proposition only ensures that the process in the unperturbed case will
end up4 at one of the monomorphic price profiles. However we are still not
3This is possible: For example if one firm sets pi = c and the other pj > c the profit
for both firms would be zero.
4Almost sure, this means that the probability that it will happen is one.
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able to favor one of the closed communication classes as Imitation Equilib-
rium.
2.3.2 Path Dependence
The analysis of the unperturbed process could not distinguish between all
the monomorphic states because every monomorphic state can be reached5
and will then be played forever on. The monormophic state in which the
process ends up depends strongly on the initial price profile. Therefore, the
finally selected state is not independent of the initial price profile. Such a
behavior is called path dependent.
In order to get rid of this problem we will introduce small perturbations
in each round of the process. The analysis of such a perturbed process is
closely connected to the analysis of the unperturbed process, so we can use
the results made here, in particular proposition 1, for the analysis of the
perturbed process.
2.4 Perturbed Process
The perturbed process can be viewed as an extension of the unperturbed
process. In the perturbed process, the imitation dynamics will be enriched
with a mutation mechanism. The mutation comes into effect after the im-
itation. After adjusting their prices in the revision step, firms will mutate
with a small independent probability  > 0. If they mutate, they will choose
a price in the price grid Γ randomly. The only assumption on the random
selection is that every price in the grid is selected with a positive probability
(∀p ∈ Γ,∀i ∈ {1, 2} holds Pi(p) > 0). So the distribution has be neither
uniform nor the same for both players.
This mutation can be interpreted economically in different ways. One
possible explanation is that mutations are simply errors of the firms which
occur with a small probability. These errors could also be interpreted as
experiments of the firm. An economic motivation of such experiments would
be that sometimes it happens that a firm will be replaced by a new firm.
The newly entered firm does not know which prices were played in the round
before. Without any information this firm will experiment setting one of the
possible prices at random.
5With a high revision probability this monomorphic state will be reached already after
few rounds.
16
Round t begins
pi(t), pj(t), if t = 1 use
random initial values
Market Interaction
The pii(t) and pij(t)
are now known
Revision Step
set pi(t + 1) = pi(t)
Imitation
set pi(t + 1) to the
price of the more
successful firm
Mutation Step
Mutation
set pi(t + 1) randomly
to some price in Γ
Round t ends
Revision opportunity arises
prob : w
Revision opportunity
doesn’t arise
prob : 1− w
Mutation opportunity arises
prob : 
Mutation opportunity
doesn’t arise
prob : 1− 
Figure 2.1: The steps in the perturbed model for player i
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In the figure 2.1 the flow chart of a round with the revision opportunity
and mutation mechanism is shown sequentially. This chart shows only the
flow for the firm i but it is the same for player j.
2.4.1 Mathematical Implications
Through the introduction of mutation into the Markov chain the process
becomes irreducible. Irreducibility means that in the process only one com-
munication class exists which contains all states of the state space Ω. The
presence of mistakes makes any transition between two states possible. Thus
there is an unique closed communication class which contains all states.
As any state can be reached from any state in the process, this process is
also ergodic6. This property allows us to get rid of the path dependency of
the unperturbed process. Every ergodic Markov chain has a unique invariant
distribution, denoted by µ, over the state space. This means that if the pro-
cess runs forever (t→∞), the average fraction of time it stays in every state
equals the value given by the invariant distribution. Clearly, this distribution
depends on the mutation rate  as well as on the revision probability w. We
will focus on the dependency of the invariant distribution on the mutation
rate and will therefore write µ() as a function of the mutation probability.
2.4.2 Solution Concept
As we are assuming positive mutation rates, the calculation of the invariant
distribution µ() for a fixed value of  would be the best characterization of
the behavior of the process. This explicit computation of µ() is mathemat-
ically difficult. Since the calculation of
µ? = lim
→0
µ()
is easier and still gives a good approximation for very small , this limit
invariant distribution is mostly used in literature.7
Usually, the whole weight of the invariant distribution µ? is only concen-
trated on one or few states by the limiting process. The states with positive
weights in the limit of the invariant distribution are called Long Run Equi-
libria (LRE ) of the process.
6This implication holds only in processes with an finite state space.
7see Ellison (2000, p. 22)
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So if only one state has the whole weight of the distribution and the
process runs forever, the process would in average almost surely be in that
specific state.
There are different approaches to determine the LRE. In this work we
will focus on the Freidlin and Wentzell approach. Another technique is for
example the (modified) Radius-Coradius approach which was introduced by
Ellison (2000).
Freidlin and Wentzell
We will use the same technique as in Vega-Redondo (1997b). He used the
Freidlin & Wentzell (1984) approach to calculate the long run equilibrium of
the Markov process. This is a graph theoretic approach, which leads directly
to the LRE. The first economic works which used this approach to determine
the LRE have be done by Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993). This
approach works basically as follows8:
For every closed communication class h′ ∈ H (H denotes the set of all
closed communication classes)9 of the unperturbed process P 0 we define Sh′
as the set of all possible spanning trees over all h ∈ H which are rooted in h′.
A spanning tree is a directed tree, in which from every vertex a unique path
to the root vertex exists. Thus, the spanning tree has no cycles and every
vertex, except for the root, has one outgoing edge.
All directed edges (hi, hj) of a spanning tree s ∈ Sh′ are assigned the
costs of a move from the communication class hi to hj in the process P
.
The costs of moving are simply the required numbers of mutations to reach
the communication class hj from hi. At this point, we let the costs of a the
whole spanning tree s be denoted by c(s) , which is just the sum of all edges
of the spanning tree s.
The stochastic potential σh of a communication class h is given by the
cost of the spanning tree that has minimal costs. Therefore we have:
σh′ = min
s∈Sh′
c(s)
Finally, we only have to compare the stochastic potential of all commu-
nication classes. The communication classes with the minimal stochastic
8A more detailed introduction can be found for example in Vega-Redondo (1997a,
Chapter 5)
9As shown in our case before, the set of all closed communication classes are all
monomorphic singletons.
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potential are the Long Run Equilibria.
Based on the LRE we define the Imitation Equilibria.
Definition 1. Imitation Equilibria We call the LRE of the ‘imitation of
the best’ dynamics ‘Imitation Equilibria’.
Note that all Long Run Equilibria of a Markov process, which uses the
described imitation dynamics, are monomorphic and singletons.10 Therefore,
we can refer with Imitation Equilibria to states and not to communication
classes. We will denote the price used in the price profile of the monomorphic
Imitation Equilibrium by Imitation Price.
2.4.3 Analysis
In this section we apply the Freidlin and Wentzell approach to our model.Let
us begin with the question: Which small mutation steps on the price grid will
be followed?
This question can be mathematically formalized in the following inequal-
ity: pii(p+δ, p) ≥ pij(p+δ, p). First, let us only consider upward mutations11.
pii(p+ δ, p) ≥ pij(p+ δ, p)
pii(p+ δ, p) ≥ pii(p, p+ δ)
(p+ δ − c)si(p+ δ, p) ≥ (p− c)si(p, p+ δ)
(p+ δ − c) 1
2t
(t− δ) ≥ (p− c) 1
2t
(δ + t)
δt− δ2 + 2cδ ≥ 2pδ
p ≤ c+ t
2
− δ
2
As the resulting upward mutation prices are elements of the price grid Γ,
the price c+ t
2
− δ is the highest price that fulfills this inequality.
The same analysis can be done for downward mutations:
10See proposition 1.
11We are assuming here that δ is sufficiently small, at least smaller than the transport
costs t so that both firms have a market share greater than zero.
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pii(p− δ, p) ≥ pij(p− δ, p)
pii(p− δ, p) ≥ pii(p, p− δ)
(p− δ − c)si(p− δ, p) ≥ (p− c)si(p, p− δ)
(p− δ − c) 1
2t
(t+ δ) ≥ (p− c) 1
2t
(t− δ)
2pδ ≥ 2cδ + δt+ δ2
p ≥ c+ t
2
+
δ
2
Here we get the same result. Thus downward mutations will be followed
until the price c+ t
2
is reached. We anticipate that the price p? = c+ t
2
will be
our Imitation Equilibrium, therefore this price will be in the price grid Γ by
assumption. This means that all ‘one step’ upward and downward mutations
will be followed until this price is reached.
We have found a candidate for the Imitation Equilibrium. Note that the
obtained result ensures only that ‘one step’ upward and downward mutations
will not permit the abandonment of the price profile ω? := (p?, p?). It could
still be possible that other types of mutations allow the abandonment of this
state. To ensure that this is not possible we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2. A firm which uniquely sets the price p? has a profit higher than
the profit of the other firm.
Proof. We claim:
pii(pi, pj) ≥ pij(pi, pj) (2.1)
for pi = c+
1
2
t
We obtain by using 1.4:(
(c+
1
2
t)− c)(pj + t− (c+ 1
2
t)
) ≥ (pj − c)((c+ 1
2
t) + t− pj
)
Simplification of this term leads to:
p2j − 2pjc− tpj + c2 + tc+
1
4
t2 ≥ 0
By transforming12 this expression we obtain:
p2j − 2pj(c+
1
2
t) + (c+
1
2
t)2 ≥ 0
12The equality c2 + tc+ 14 t
2 = (c+ 12 t)
2 is used here.
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Finally we obtain a quadratic function which is clearly greater than zero:(
pj − (c+ 1
2
t)
)2 ≥ 0
and therefore: (
pj − (c+ 1
2
t)
)2
> 0 if pj 6= c+ 1
2
t
With this lemma we can apply the Freidlin and Wentzell approach to
this Markov process.
To switch from one state in a closed communication class to a state in
another communication class at least one mutation is needed. The analysis
above has shown us that this price leads in the worst case to the profit of
the other firm or otherwise to a higher profit. Therefore, the closed commu-
nication class which contains the state ω? := (c+ 1
2
t, c+ 1
2
t), denoted by hω? ,
needs two mutations to be abandoned.
On the contrary, to move from any other closed communication class to
hω? , only one mutation is required. The lemma 2 ensures that in this case
the profit of the mutating firm is higher than the profit of the non-mutating
firm.
According to these characteristics of the required mutations, we can con-
struct a spanning tree which is rooted in the closed communication class hω?
with a stochastic potential of:
σhω? = mins∈Shω?
c(s) = |Γ| − 1 = γ
|Γ| is the cardinality of the set Γ. The tree has |Γ| = γ + 1 nodes and,
therefore, |Γ| − 1 = γ edges. A possible way to construct such a spanning
tree would be to simply connect every closed communication class with the
root (see figure 2.2).
Now we only have to show that all other possible spanning trees, with a
different communication class as root, have a higher stochastic potential.
We know that every spanning tree with a different root has to contain an
outgoing edge from the communication class hω? . This edge has the cost of
two mutations. Also every other directed edge has at least the cost of one
mutation, so we get:
σhω = min
s∈Shω
c(s) ≥ |Γ| = γ + 1 for ∀ω ∈ H, ω 6= ω?
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h0 hδ . . . h(γ−1)δ hγδ
hω?
1 1 1 1
Figure 2.2: Spanning tree with hω? as root
Hence, we get the inequality:
σhω? < σhω for ∀ω ∈ H, ω 6= ω?
Accordingly, the closed communication class hω? is the class with the
lowest stochastic potential and therefore the long run equilibrium communi-
cation class. The Imitation Equilibrium is therefore the price profile (p?, p?)
with p? = c+ 1
2
t.
Relative Payoff Maximization
At this point we will add another interesting derivation of the Imitation
Equilibrium. Alo´s-Ferrer & Ania (2005) have shown (proposition 4 of the
paper) that a strictly, globally stable finite Evolutionary Stable Set (ESS) is
also the unique stochastically stable state with the imitation dynamics. The
intuition behind this is quite simple: ESS can be defined as relative payoff
maximizer13. Thus playing an ESS does not maximize the own profit, it tries
instead to perform relatively better than the others14. Exactly this relative
performance is the basic principle of imitation.
The definition of an ESS was originally introduced by Maynard Smith
& Price (1973). As this definition captured only infinite population games,
Schaffer (1988) introduced a formal definition for finite population games.
Applied to our model this definition leads to:
Definition 2. p? is a finite ESS if for all p ∈ Γ:
pi(p?, p) ≥ pi(p, p?)
13An ESS is a Nash Equilibrium in the derived game with relative payoffs.
14Such an behavior is called ‘spiteful behavior’, see Alo´s-Ferrer & Ania (2005, page 9).
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And p? is a strict finite ESS if the equality is only achieved for p = p?.
Note that in a game with the population size of two (like in the Hotelling
Game) every (strict) finite ESS is also a globally stable (strict) finite ESS.
This is simply due to the fact that in a two-player game, at most one player
can mutate and still play against a player which plays the ESS strategy.
With Lemma 2, we have already shown that the strategy price p? is a
strictly, globally stable ESS and therefore an Imitation Equilibrium. How-
ever, we will provide another proof since we will use this approach later on
to directly determine the Imitation Equilibrium.
An equivalent definition for the ESS in symmetric aggregative games
is that the ESS are maximizing the relative payoffs. Hence, the Imitation
Equilibrium can also be derived as follows:
argmax
pi
pii(pi, pj)− pij(pi, pj) =
We get the following expression by using the profit formula 1.4:
argmax
pi
1
2t
(
(pi − c)(pj + t− pi)− (pj − c)(pi + t− pj)
)
Solving this maximization problem, we calculate the first derivative:
d(pii(pi, pj)− pij(pi, pj))
dpi
=
1
2t
(t− 2pi + 2c)
By setting this derivative to zero we obtain the price pi which maximizes
15
the relative profit of firm i:
0 =
1
2t
(t− 2pi + 2c) =⇒ pi = c+ 1
2
t (2.2)
By applying the proposition 416 of Alo´s-Ferrer & Ania (2005) the proof
that the state (c+ 1
2
t, c+ 1
2
t) is the unique Imitation Equilibrium is completed.
15The second derivation leads to − 2t which is smaller than zero, therefore, we obtain a
maximum.
16“Let Γ ≡ (N,S,Π) be a symmetric N -player game with finite S. Let s? be a strictly
globally stable ESS. Then, the profile (s?, . . . , s?) is the unique stochastically stable state
of the imitation dynamics with experimentation.”
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2.5 Remarks
Consequently, the obtained Imitation Price is lower than the Nash Equilib-
rium price (see 1.6) but still above the marginal cost pricing. Interestingly
enough, the Imitation Price lies exactly between marginal cost pricing and
the Nash Equilibrium price.
Prices are lower and therefore also the profits of the firms are lower; to
be more precise: the profit of the firms in the Imitation Equilibrium are only
half of the Nash Equilibrium profits.
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Chapter 3
Modifications
In this chapter we will drop some assumptions which we have made before
for the simple model introduced in section 1.1. It will be shown that some of
the used assumptions are essential to obtain a unique Imitation Equilibrium.
3.1 Distribution of the consumers
At the beginning, as the first modification, we will start modifying the dis-
tribution of the consumers in the unit interval. Until now we have simply
used a uniform distribution (see figure 1.1).
3.1.1 Distribution
We will construct a quite simple distribution that allows us to center the
weight of the consumer distribution on the middle of the unit interval with
a parameter α.
By simply using the property that the function f(x) := xα has for all
values of α ∈ R++ the function values f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1 and the property
that the function monotonically increases1 in different shapes depending on
the parameter α it is quite simple to construct such a distribution function.
We will only consider symmetric distributions.
By scaling, copying and mirroring the interval [0, 1] of the function we
1We only consider the interval [0, 1].
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can construct the following cumulative distribution function:
Fα(x) =

0 x < 0
1
2
(2x)α 0 ≤ x < 1
2
1− 1
2
(
2(1− x))α 1
2
≤ x ≤ 1
1 x > 1
Derivation leads to the density function:
fα(x) =

α(2x)α−1 0 ≤ x < 1
2
α
(
2(1− x))α−1 1
2
≤ x ≤ 1
0 else
Limit Cases
The upper limit case limα→∞ fα(x) leads to a distribution that has the entire
weight at one point. This point lise exactly at the middle of the unit interval2.
The lower limit case limα→0↓ fα(x) puts the half of the entire weight on
each of the two ends of the unit interval.
By setting α = 1 we obtain the uniform distribution, so the uniform
distribution used in the simple model is a special case of this parametric
distribution function. Figure 3.1 illustrates the density and cumulative dis-
tribution function for some different values of α. There it can be seen that
a value greater than one leads to a higher weight of consumers in the center
area of the unit interval, whereas values below one cause the contrary.
3.1.2 Profit and market share
The market share can be analogously calculated like in the simple model.
The only difference is that the obtained market share of the uniform case has
to be weighted by the cumulative distribution function.
So the market share of player i given the prices pi and pj denoted by
sαi (pi, pj) can be calculated with s
α
i (pi, pj) = Fα
(
si(pi, pj)
)
.
The profit function can be directly derived from (1.3):
2Can also be seen by the variance of the probability distribution: limα→∞Var(Xα) =
limα→∞ 12(1+α)(2+α) = 0
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Figure 3.1: Density and cumulative distribution function for different values
of α
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piαi (pi, pj) = (pi − c)sαi (pi, pj) = (pi − c)Fα
(
si(pi, pj)
)
3.1.3 Nash Equilibrium
Proposition 3. For α ∈ [1,∞) a Nash Equilibrium is given by:
p?i/j = c+
t
α
(3.1)
The proof of this proposition can be found in the in the appendix A.1.
3.1.4 Imitation Equilibrium
Here we will use the same procedure that we have already used in the analysis
of the simple model (section 2.4.3).
First we are looking which small upward price mutation will be followed
by the other firm.
piαi (p+ δ, p) ≥ piαj (p+ δ, p)
piαi (p+ δ, p) ≥ piαi (p, p+ δ)
(p+ δ − c)sαi (p+ δ, p) ≥ (p− c)sαi (p, p+ δ)
(p+ δ − c)Fα
(
si(p+ δ, p)
) ≥ (p− c)Fα(si(p, p+ δ))
(p+ δ − c)Fα
(
si(p+ δ, p)
) ≥ (p− c)(1− Fα(si(p+ δ, p)))
p− c ≤ (2p+ δ − 2c)Fα
(
si(p+ δ, p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 1
2
, because δ>0
)
p− c ≤ 1
2
(2p+ δ − 2c)(2si(p+ δ, p))α
p− c ≤ 1
2
(2p+ δ − 2c)
(
2
(p+ t− (p+ δ)
2t
))α
p− c ≤ 1
2
(2p+ δ − 2c)
(t− δ
t
)α
p
(
1 +
(t− δ
t
)α) ≤ 1
2
(δ − 2c)
(t− δ
t
)α
+ c
p ≤
1
2
(δ − 2c)( t−δ
t
)α
+ c
1 +
(
t−δ
t
)α
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To get the exact limit where no upward price mutation would be followed
independently of δ, we calculate the limit of this obtained expression as δ
approaches 0. This can be seen as infinite refinement of the price grid.
lim
δ→0
1
2
(δ − 2c)
(
t−δ
t
)α
+ c
1 +
(
t−δ
t
)α
This expression leads to the indeterminate form 0
0
. Due to L’Hoˆpital’s
rule3 the limit can be calculated by limiting the derivation of the numerator
and denominator:
lim
δ→0
1
2
(δ − 2c)( t−δ
t
)α
+ c
1 +
(
t−δ
t
)α = lim
δ→0
1
2
+ αc
t
α
t
= c+
t
2α
The same calculation can also be done for downward mutation:
piαi (p− δ, p) ≥ piαj (p− δ, p)
piαi (p− δ, p) ≥ piαi (p, p− δ)
(p− δ − c)sαi (p− δ, p) ≥ (p− c)sαi (p, p− δ)
(p− δ − c)Fα
(
si(p− δ, p)
) ≥ (p− c)Fα(si(p, p− δ))
(p− δ − c)
(
1− Fα
(
si(p, p− δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 1
2
)) ≥ (p− c)Fα(si(p, p− δ))
p− δ − c ≥ 1
2
(2p− δ − 2c)
(t− δ
t
)α
p
(
1− (t− δ
t
)α) ≥ −1
2
(δ + 2c)
(t− δ
t
)α
+ δ + c
p ≥ −
1
2
(δ + 2c)
(
t−δ
t
)α
+ δ + c
1− ( t−δ
t
)α
By calculating the limit by using L’Hoˆpital’s rule we obtain:
lim
δ→0
−1
2
(δ + 2c)
(
t−δ
t
)α
+ δ + c
1− ( t−δ
t
)α = lim
δ→0
1
2
+ αc
t
α
t
= c+
t
2α
The upward and the downward mutation limits are the same, therefore we
obtain a price candidate for the Imitation Equilibrium. We will use again the
3also known as Bernoulli’s rule
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proposition 4 of Alo´s-Ferrer & Ania (2005) and prove that the obtained can-
didate is the unique Imitation Equilibrium by proving that the price strategy
c+ t
2α
is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy.
The proof only captures the parameter values α ≥ 1 and it is important
to mention that it does not hold for α < 1
2
.
Proposition 4. The price c + t
2α
is the Imitation Equilibrium price for all
α ≥ 1.
Proof. We will prove this proposition by showing that the price p = c + t
2α
is an globally stable strict finite ESS.
To do that we have to show that4:
∀α ≥ 1,∀p ∈ Γ, p 6= c+ t
2α
: piαi
(
c+
t
2α
, p
)
> piαj
(
c+
t
2α
, p
)
To simplify matters we will set the marginal costs in this proof to zero.
The following result however holds also for positive marginal costs.
piαi
( t
2α
, p
)
> piαj
( t
2α
, p
)
piαi
( t
2α
, p
)
> piαi
(
p,
t
2α
)
t
2α
sαi
( t
2α
, p
)
> p sαi
(
p,
t
2α
)
Because of the piecewise definition of the distribution function we have to
consider the two different cases 0 ≤ p < t
2α
and p > t
2α
. Let us start with
the first case:
t
2α
Fα
(
si
( t
2α
, p
))
> p
(
1− Fα
(
si
( t
2α
, p
)))
( t
2α
+ p
)
Fα
(
si
( t
2α
, p
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 1
2
)
> p
1
2
( t
2α
+ p
)(
2
(p− t− t
2α
2t
))α
> p
1
2
( 1
2α
+
p
t
)(
1− 1
2α
+
p
t
)α
>
p
t
4piαi
(
c+ t2α , p
)
= piαj
(
c+ t2α , p
)
for p = c+ t2α trivially holds.
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Now we will substitute p
t
with x. The considered interval is therefore: 0 ≤
x < 1
2α
f(x) :=
1
2
( 1
2α
+ x
)(
1− 1
2α
+ x
)α
− x > 0
Now we will prove that this function (denoted by f(x)) is strictly positive
in the interval [0, 1
2α
) for the parameter value α ≥ 1.
Derivation of the function f(x) leads to:
df(x)
dx
=
1
2
(
α
(
1− 1
2α
+ x
)α−1( 1
2α
+ x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
+
(
1− 1
2α
+ x
)α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
)
− 1
df(x)
dx
< 0 for ∀x ∈ [0, 1
2α
)
So the function is strictly decreasing in the interval [0, 1
2α
). Observing
that the function value at 1
2α
is zero ensures that the inequality piαi (
t
2α
, p) ≥
piαj (
t
2α
, p) holds for 0 ≤ p < t
2α
.
Now we will continue the proof for the other case: p > t
2α
. We can split
this area into the two intervals I1 : (
t
2α
, t
2α
+ t] and I2 : (
t
2α
+ t,∞).
The proof for the interval I2 is trivial, because the difference between the
two prices is already large enough for firm i with the higher price to face
zero demand and therefore has no market share and no profits. The other
firm will have positive profits because the price p = t
2α
is above the marginal
costs of 0.
For the interval I1 we get:
t
2α
(
1− Fα
(
si
(
p,
t
2α
)))
> pFα
(
si
(
p,
t
2α
))
t
2α
>
( t
2α
+ p
)
Fα
(
si
(
p,
t
2α
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 1
2
)
1
α
>
( 1
2α
+
p
t
)(
2
( t
2α
− t− p
2t
))α
0 >
( 1
2α
+
p
t
)(
1 +
1
2α
− p
t
)α
− 1
α
Substituting p
t
by x, defining the function g(x) for the right-hand side of the
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inequality and calculating the first derivative results in:
dg(x)
dx
=
(
1 +
1
2α
− x
)α
− α
(
1 +
1
2α
− x
)α−1( 1
2α
+ x
)
=
(
1 +
1
2α
− x
)α−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
α + 1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
( 1
2α
− x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
dg(x)
dx
< 0 for ∀x ∈ ( 1
2α
,
1
2α
+ 1]
Knowing that g( 1
2α
) = 0 and that the function is decreasing in the interval
I1 we have also proven that the inequality pi
α
i (
t
2α
, p) ≥ piαj ( t2α , p) holds for
p > t
2α
.
In the appendix B you can find simulation results for α-values greater
and lower than 1.
3.1.5 Remarks
As we can see here the result obtained in chapter 2 is also included here.5
Another interesting detail of the result is:
lim
α→∞
c+
t
2α
= c
As we can see there is a smooth transition to marginal cost pricing. This
does not only hold for the Imitation Equilibrium, also the Nash Equilibrium
converges to marginal cost pricing as α → ∞. So the parameter α with
values in the interval [1,∞) allows a smooth transition from the Bertrand
Competition to the Hotelling Game.
3.2 Transport Costs
A possible modification could be also the the functional form of the transport
costs. We will not do this here but we will consider the case of no transport
costs at all in this section we. The Nash Equilibrium without transport costs
is the well known Bertrand Nash Equilibrium implying marginal cost pricing
as Nash Equilibrium in our simple model.
5By setting α to 1 we obtain the same result as in the subsection 2.4.3.
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Intuitively one would assume that also in the case of zero transport costs
the price profile (c, c) would be the only Imitation Equilibrium of the Markov
process. Yet this does not hold, because for every closed communication class
hp′ with p
′ ≥ c can be found a spanning tree with the stochastic potential of
γ. We will show this in the proof of following proposition.
Proposition 5. Without transport costs every monomorphic state with a
price higher than the marginal costs is a Imitation Equilibrium.
Proof. If one firm mutates to marginal cost pricing both firms would have
zero profits6, so there is a positive probability that the firm with marginal
cost pricing will be imitated. Therefore it is only one mutation needed to
reach the communication class hc which consists of the singleton (c, c). If
later on in that state one of the firms would mutate to a higher price p′
the firm with marginal cost pricing will still be confronted with zero profits.
Therefore in the next rounds there exists a positive probability that the price
p′ would be imitated by this firm. Thus every closed communication class
hp′ with p
′ ≥ c can be reached with only one mutation from the class hc. So
there exists for every closed communication class hp′ with p
′ ≥ c a spanning
tree with the stochastic potential of γ. Such a spanning tree is depicted in
figure 3.2.
h0 hδ . . . h(γ−1)δ hγδ
hc
hω
1 1 1 1
1
Figure 3.2: Spanning trees (ct = 0)
6If the other firm charged a price less than the marginal costs the firm would have
negative profits, but than also the following imitation could occur.
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Every closed communication class hp′ has the same stochastic potential
hence all of them are LRE. Therefore all monomorphic states are Imitation
Equilibria.
In the appendix B you can find a simulation result of such a process.
This behavior can only occur if c is in the price grid Γ. If this is not
the case, the communication class with the smallest price greater than the
marginal costs would be the LRE.
Imitation in the Bertrand Competition has been studied7 by Alos-Ferrer,
Ania & Schenk-Hoppe (2000). Instead of the here resulting trivial Bertrand
Model they used a n-player game as base model and assume convex produc-
tion costs.
3.3 Production Costs
3.3.1 Marginal Costs
We already captured symmetric marginal costs in the simple model. By
introducing asymmetric marginal costs (denoted by ci, cj for the firms i, j
respectively) in the Hotelling Game we will in general not obtain a unique
Imitation Equilibrium.8 If we use Relative Payoff Maximization as we did
in subsection 2.4.3 we obtain in fact a single maximizer pi =
1
2
(ci + cj + t),
counterpart to equation 2.2, but still this maximizer leads to a negative
relative payoff for the firm with the higher marginal costs. Let us denote this
relative payoff maximizer with prm for the following analysis.
To get a better idea of what is happening in such circumstances we will
again ask following question: “Which mutation will be followed?” The fol-
lowing inequalities are representing this question mathematically:
7They used the same evolutionary approach like we are using in this paper.
8However there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium: pi =
1
3 (2ci + cj) + t
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Upward mutation:
pii(p+ δ, p) ≥ pij(p+ δ, p)
(p+ δ − ci)(t− δ) ≥ (p− cj)(t+ δ)
ciδ + cjδ + tδ + cjt− cit− δ2 ≥ 2pδ
prm +
t
2δ
(cj − ci)− δ
2
≥ p
Downward mutation:
pii(p− δ, p) ≥ pij(p− δ, p)
(p− δ − ci)(t+ δ) ≥ (p− cj)(t− δ)
2pδ ≥ ciδ + cjδ + tδ + cit− cjt+ δ2
p ≥ prm − t
2δ
(cj − ci) + δ
2
Let us assume that the firm i is the low cost firm, so ci < cj holds. These
inequalities imply that every upward and downward mutation of firm i away
from a price p ∈ Γ and p ∈ I,
I :=
[
prm −
( t
2δ
(cj − ci)− δ
2
)
, prm +
( t
2δ
(cj − ci)− δ
2
)]
(3.2)
will be followed by the other firm. So if a revision possibility arises only one
mutation is needed to reach these states.
This means that for all closed communication classes hp, p ∈ Γ ∧ p ∈ I
there is a spanning tree with a stochastic potential of γ. All of these com-
munication classes are therefore LRE and thus we obtain various Imitation
Equilibria states.
Now lets look at the expression t
2δ
(cj − ci) which is contained in both
inequalities. This expression can be arbitrarily large for small δ, meaning
that all monomorphic states could be LRE if the grid step size is small
enough.
This result coincides with the result of Apesteguia, Huck, Oechssler &
Weidenholzer (2010). The authors analyzed the Imitation Equilibrium in
the Cournot Competition and figured out that slight differences in the cost
structure of the players also leads to multiple LRE.
In the appendix B you can find a simulation result of a process with
asymmetric marginal costs.
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3.3.2 Fixed Costs
Let us denote the fixed costs with fi, fj for the firms i, j respectively. Clearly,
the Imitation Equilibrium will not be influenced by symmetric fixed costs.
Like in the case of asymmetric marginal costs (3.3.1) we can calculate an
interval I in which downward and upward mutations of the lower cost firm
will be followed by the other firm:
I :=
[
pim +
( t
δ
(fj − fi)− δ
2
)
, pim −
( t
δ
(fj − fi)− δ
2
)]
(3.3)
The term pim denotes the Imitation Equilibrium in the case of symmetric
costs, thus pim = c +
t
2
. This interval is almost the same like the interval I
in the case of asymmetric marginal costs (3.2). Therefore also in the case of
asymmetric fixed costs the amount of LRE depends on the grid step size δ.
With a small enough δ all monomorphic states are getting LRE.
Comparing the intervals defined in (3.2) and (3.3) shows us that the
length of the interval I grows twice as fast in respect to the difference of the
fixed cost than to the difference in the marginal cost. This means that the
LRE is more sensitive to differences in the fixed costs.
3.3.3 Remarks
These results clarify that an imitation behavior is only reasonable in sym-
metric environments.
If one player has a cost advantage, the other players can never achieve
the same success by imitation. On the contrary, the disadvantaged player
will also follow ‘stupid’ actions as long as the success of the other player is
higher. Exactly this is happening in the previous analyses of the Imitation
Equilibria in asymmetric environments.
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Chapter 4
Simulation
We already mentioned in section 2.4.2 that the limit invariant distribution
µ? is used because it simplifies the calculation and still approximates the
distribution for very small values of the mutation rates . However on the
one hand we introduce mutation to obtain an invariant distribution over
all states in the Markov chain (see 2.4.1). On the other hand we are only
looking at the limit of the invariant distribution. In this limiting process the
mutation probability goes to zero and therefore we are actually looking at a
process in which no mutations occur.
Therefore in this chapter we will focus on the invariant distribution with
positive mutation probabilities, because as also Ellison (2000, p. 22) stressed
“a characterization of µ would be the ideal description of the long run con-
sequences of evolution.”.
Instead of computing the exact values we will just simulate the Markov
chain. By simulating the process a high number of times1 and counting the
periods spent in each state we can approximate2 for the invariant distribution
µ().
In appendix B.1 some technical informations about the simulation pro-
gram can be found.
1Depending on the mutation rate we use one billion and ten billion rounds for each
simulation result.
2With this approach we obtain approximations for specific values of  instead of approx-
imations for only very small mutations rates which were obtained by the limit invariant
distribution µ?.
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4.1 Mutation Rate
First we will shortly illustrate the simulation and show the behavior of the
probability distribution for decreasing values of . In figure 4.1 the probability
distributions over the state space can be seen for certain mutation rates. In
table 4.1 the commonly used parameters are shown. With these parameters
we get ω? = (10, 10) as the Imitation Equilibrium. The relative time that
the process spent in the equilibrium state is denoted by P (ω?). This relative
time can also be seen as the probability of being in state ω? if we stop the
process at a random period.
Parameters
Number of rounds 109
Price grid γ = 20, δ = 1
Initial prices u.d. over Ω
Mutation prices prob. u.d. over Γ
Revision prob. w = 0.5
Mutation prob. specified separately
Transport costs t = 10
Marginal costs c = 5
Table 4.1: Common parameters used for figure 4.1
In the figure it can be clearly seen that the probability of being in ω?
increases by reducing the mutation rate. Obviously with a mutation rate
of one we are getting nearly a uniform distribution over the state space3.
With a mutation rate of  = 10−4 already almost the whole weight of the
distribution is on the equilibrium state.
For the further simulation we will use the mutation rate values  = 10−2
and  = 10−4, because in our opinion these mutation rates represent quite
reasonable values for the occurrence of mutation. These mutation rates are
already small enough to represent errors or experiments in the game.
4.2 State Space
In this section we focus on the state space which is in our model the used
price grid. We will refine the price grid for fixed mutation rate values and
3γ = 20 therefore |Ω| = |Γ|2 = (γ + 1)2 = 441 and so ∀ω ∈ Ω : P (hω) ≈ 1441 ≈ 0.0023.
We are getting this value for P (ω?) for the mutation rate of one.
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(a)  = 1, P (ω?) = 0.0023
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(b)  = 0.5, P (ω?) = 0.0214
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(c)  = 0.1, P (ω?) = 0.2091
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(d)  = 0.05, P (ω?) = 0.3666
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(e)  = 10−2, P (ω?) = 0.7539
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(f)  = 10−4, P (ω?) = 0.9967
Figure 4.1: Probability distributions for different mutation rate values
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compare the probabilities of being in the Imitation Equilibrium.
For the simulation results displayed in table 4.2 we used almost the same
parameters as in the previous simulation (stated in table 4.1) except for the
used price grid and the mutation rate which vary for each simulation and are
listed separately in the result table.4
γ δ
P (ω?)
 = 10−2  = 10−4
10 2.000 0.851958 0.998248
20 1.000 0.753094 0.996804
50 0.400 0.560616 0.992861
100 0.200 0.393368 0.985254
200 0.100 0.247446 0.970592
500 0.040 0.116283 0.931960
1000 0.020 0.062183 0.862690
2000 0.010 0.032084 0.781912
5000 0.004 0.012772 0.599235
10000 0.002 0.006572 0.213496
Table 4.2: P (ω?) in respect to the size of the price grid
Note that the maximum price is 20 units for all grid sizes. Thus we are
only refining the price grid. Also the Imitation Price of 10 units is in every
refinement in the price grid Γ, since γ is an even number in every specified
simulation.
Interestingly for the high mutation rate case ( = 10−2) and for γ values
around 200 we are already getting probabilities to stay in the equilibrium
state smaller than a fourth. This means the process is in the Long Run
Equilibrium on average only every fourth period. In the case of the low
mutation rate we arrive at this point at the a grid size of around 10000.5
Thus with a fixed positive mutation rate the actual time spent in a Long
Run Equilibrium depends considerably on the grid size. Therefore we should
not only consider and analyze the implication of the equilibrium state but
rather also the implications of the off-equilibrium states because the process
spends more time in off-equilibrium states than in the equilibrium state.6
4To get more robust results we used 1010 rounds for the results of the low mutation
rate  = 10−4.
5You are still reading? You owe me an explanation. I owe you a glass of wine.
6However in our model the probable off-equilibrium states have all prices near the
Imitation Price. In other games there could be a fundamental difference between the
equilibrium state and some off-equilibrium states, like in coordination games.
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Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that in the Hotelling Game imitation behavior
leads to more competitive outcomes than the Nash Equilibrium.
Interestingly the Imitation Equilibrium lies exactly between marginal cost
pricing and the Nash Equilibrium. In the modification chapter we have seen
that this result holds also for modified consumer distributions. As well we
have seen that by introducing asymmetric cost structures for the player the
uniqueness of the Imitation Equilibrium gets lost.
In the last part we simulated the Markov Process and checked the ro-
bustness of the Imitation Equilibrium with positive mutation rates, since the
definition of the Imitation Equilibrium is based on a limiting process. There
we have seen that the grid size influences considerable the long run behavior
of the process.
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Appendix A
Mathematical Proofs
A.1 Proof of proposition 3
To prove the proposition 3 we have to show that the best response to p? =
c + t
α
is p?. For simplicity we will set the marginal cost c in this proof to
zero. The proof would be analogous with marginal costs different from zero.
Mathematically expressed we have to show that argmaxp pi
α
i (p,
t
α
) = t
α
. Lets
start:
argmax
p
piαi (p,
t
α
) =
argmax
p
p sαi (p,
t
α
) =
argmax
p
pFα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
)
Because of the piecewise definition of Fα(x) we have to consider four
different cases:
Case 1: p ≤ t
α
− t
If the price of firm i is smaller than t
α
− t the firm gets the whole market
share si(p,
t
α
) = 1. So the maximization problem on this interval is simply
argmaxp p. The maximizer is therefore p
1? = t
α
−t. In this case the maximum
profit and the maximizer coincide.1
1This case is irrelevant in the proof with zero marginal costs and α > 1, because we
are not allowing negative prices. However this case would for example be necessary with
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Case 2: p ≥ t
α
+ t
This is the contrary case to the first case. The price is too high and no
consumer will buy from firm i. The market share is zero and so are the
profits. Maximizers are in this case all p ≥ t
α
+ t therefore the maximizers
p2? on this interval are the whole interval and the maximum profit reached
is zero.
Case 3: t
α
≤ p < t
α
+ t
The price of firm i is higher than the price of the other firm but still small
enough to have some market share. The unweighted market share lies in
the interval (0, 1
2
] so in this case we can use for Fα(x) =
1
2
(2x)α and for
fα(x) = α(2x)
α−1.
We will maximize this function on that interval, so we need the first
derivative of the profit function in respect to p:
d piαi (p,
t
α
)
dp
=
d
(
pFα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
))
dp
(A.1)
= Fα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
)
+ pfα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
) d
dp
(
si(p,
t
α
)
)
(A.2)
= Fα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
)− p
2t
fα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
)
(A.3)
By setting the derivative to zero we get the turning point:
d piαi (p,
t
α
)
dp
= 0
Fα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
)
=
p
2t
fα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
)
1
2
(
2si(p,
t
α
)
)α
=
pα
2t
(
2si(p,
t
α
)
)α−1
si(p,
t
α
) =
pα
2t
1
2t
( t
α
+ t− p) = pα
2t
p(1 + α) = t
(
1 +
1
α
)
p =
t
α
c > tα (α− 1).
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To check whether this is a maximum or a minimum we could calculate the
second derivative. We will not do this here, because the second derivative2
would contain the first derivative of the density function fα(x) which does
not exist at the point x = t
α
. Instead we will show that the first derivative
is negative on the whole interval except for the crucial point t
α
.
d piαi (p,
t
α
)
dp
= Fα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
)− p
2t
fα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
)
=
1
2
(
2si(p,
t
α
)
)α − pα
2t
(
2si(p,
t
α
)
)α−1
=
(
2si(p,
t
α
)
)α−1(
si(p,
t
α
)− pα
2t
)
=
(
2si(p,
t
α
)
)α−1( tα + t− p
2t
− pα
2t
)
=
(
2si(p,
t
α
)
)α−1
2t
( t
α
+ t− p− pα
)
=
(1 + α)
(
2si(p,
t
α
)
)α−1
2t︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
( t
α
− p
)
The expression
(
t
α
− p) is negative in the considered interval except for
p = t
α
. So we have in this interval the maximizer p3? = t
α
and a maximum
profit of t
2α
.
Case 4: t
α
− t < p ≤ t
α
This case represents a price of firm i which is lower than the price of firm
j but still high enough for the other firm to have a positive market share.
Here we can use the Fα(x) = 1 − 12
(
2(1 − x))α and fα(x) = α(2(1 − x))α−1
definition of the distribution function.
2 d
2 piαi (p,
t
α )
dp2 = − 12t
(
2fα
(
si(p,
t
α )
)
+ p ddp
(
fα
(
si(p,
t
α )
)))
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Setting p = t
α
in the first derivative leads to:
Fα
(
si(
t
α
,
t
α
)
)− tα
2t
fα
(
si(
t
α
,
t
α
)
)
= 1− 1
2
(
2(1− si( t
α
,
t
α
))
)α − 1
2α
α
(
2(1− si( t
α
,
t
α
))
)α−1
= 1− 1
2
(
2(1− 1
2
)
)α − 1
2
(
2(1− 1
2
)
)α−1
= 1− 1
2
(1)α − 1
2
(1)α−1 = 0
Same procedure as before: If we can show that the first derivative is positive
on the whole interval except for the point p = t
α
we have found the maximum
on this interval.
d piαi (p,
t
α
)
dp
= Fα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
)− p
2t
fα
(
si(p,
t
α
)
)
= 1− 1
2
(
2
(
1− si(p, t
α
)
))α − pα
2t
(
2
(
1− si(p, t
α
)
))α−1
= 1− 1
2
((
2si(
t
α
, p)
)α
+
pα
t
(
2si(
t
α
, p)
)α−1)
= 1− 1
2
(
2si(
t
α
, p)
)α−1(
2si(
t
α
, p) +
pα
t
)
Let I be the open interval ( t
α
− t, t
α
). It is trivial to see that the expression
2si(
t
α
, p) is smaller than one on the whole interval I3. If we additionally
assume that α ≥ 1 we also can conclude that (2si( tα , p))α−1 ≤ 1. Thus
we now need to show only that
(
2si(
t
α
, p) + pα
t
)
< 2 on the interval I. We
have already considered the first term which is always smaller than one. The
same holds for the the second term pα
t
because this expression is increasing
in respect to p and only for the upper bound of the interval I: p = t
α
the
term reaches one. Therefore we also get the same maximizer as in case 3, so
p4? = p3?.
Comparing all maximum values of the maximizers in each interval leads
to the global maximizer p? = t
α
for ∀α ∈ [1,∞). Hence we obtain as best
response to the price pj =
t
α
the price pi =
t
α
. Due to the symmetric property
of this game this is a fixed point and therefore a Nash Equilibrium.
3The price of the other firm is lower.
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Appendix B
Simulation
B.1 Implementation
The simulation is implemented in an object oriented manner in the program-
ming language C++. It is a program designed for the console which uses
command line arguments to set the values of the parameters. The program
outputs data in such a format that this output can be used by gnuplot1 to
create the probability distribution figures that are used in the thesis.
B.2 Additional Evaluations
In this part of the appendix some simulation outputs are shown which are ref-
erenced in the text and give a visual impression (the probability distribution
over the states) of some of the presented analytic results.
Common parameters The initial price is uniformly distributed over the
state space Ω. Also if the revision opportunity arises the firms will mutate
to any price in the price grid Γ with the same probability. If not differently
stated in the parameters we assume uniformly distributed consumers, so in
terms of the distribution modification the parameter α is set to one.
1see http://www.gnuplot.info
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B.2.1 Asymmetric players
Parameters
Rounds one billion
Price grid γ = 40, δ = 1
Mutation prob.  = 0.01
Revision prob. w = 1
Transport costs t = 10
Marginal costs ci = 14, cj = 16
Table B.1: Simulation, Parameters (ci 6= cj)
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Figure B.1: Simulation, Prob. distribution (ci 6= cj)
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B.2.2 No transport costs
Marginal costs in the price grid
Parameters
Rounds one billion
Price grid γ = 20, δ = 1
Mutation prob.  = 0.01
Revision prob. w = 1
Transport costs t = 0
Marginal costs c = 5
Table B.2: Simulation, Parameters (t = 0, c ∈ Γ)
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Figure B.2: Simulation, Prob. distribution (t = 0, c ∈ Γ)
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Marginal costs not in the price grid
Parameters
Rounds one billion
Price grid γ = 10, δ = 2
Mutation prob.  = 0.01
Revision prob. w = 1
Transport costs t = 0
Marginal costs c = 5
Table B.3: Simulation, Parameters (t = 0, c /∈ Γ)
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Figure B.3: Simulation, Prob. distribution (t = 0, c /∈ Γ)
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B.2.3 Non-uniform Consumer Distribution
Centered distribution (α = 4)
Parameters
Rounds one billion
Price grid γ = 20, δ = 2
Mutation prob.  = 0.01
Revision prob. w = 1
Transport costs t = 16
Marginal costs c = 8
Consumer dist. α = 4
Table B.4: Simulation, Parameters (α = 4)
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Figure B.4: Simulation, Prob. distribution (α = 4)
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Non-centered distribution (α = 0.25)
Parameters
Rounds one billion
Price grid γ = 20, δ = 2
Mutation prob.  = 0.01
Revision prob. w = 1
Transport costs t = 16
Marginal costs c = 8
Consumer dist. α = 0.25
Table B.5: Simulation, Parameters (α = 0.25)
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Figure B.5: Simulation, Prob. distribution (α = 0.25)
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Abstract
English
Vega-Redondo has shown in the paper “The Evolution of Walrasian behav-
ior” that imitation leads to Walrasian Prices in the symmetric Cournot
Game. Instead of the Cournot Game we choose as underlying game the
Hotelling Game. Like Vega-Redondo we use the ‘imitation of the best’ dy-
namics and the Freidlin and Wentzell approach to determine the Long Run
Equilibria (LRE ). As LRE under imitation we obtain interestingly the aver-
age of the Nash Equilibrium and marginal cost pricing. Later on we test the
robustness of the obtained LRE. On the one hand we check this by slightly
altering the assumption of the underlying Hotelling Game and consider their
implication on the LRE under imitation. On the other hand we simulate the
Markov Process with positive mutation rates and focus on the probability
distribution over the state space.
German
Vega-Redondo zeigte in dem Artikel “The Evolution of Walrasian behavi-
or”, dass Imitation in einem symmetrischen Cournot-Oligopol zu den Walras
Preisen fu¨hrt. Anstelle des Cournot-Oligopol verwenden wir das Hotelling-
Modell als das zugrunde liegende Modell. Ebenso wie Vega-Redondo ver-
wenden wir die ‘Imitation des Besten’ als Dynamik und nutzen die Freidlin
und Wentzell Methode zur Bestimmung der Langzeitgleichgewichte (LZG).
Interessanterweise erhalten wir hier als LZG den Mittelwert des Nash-Gleich-
gewichtspreises und des Grenzkostenpreises. Im Anschluss darauf testen wir
die Robustheit des erhaltenen LZGes. Dies u¨berpru¨fen wir einerseits durch
kleine Modifikationen der Annahmen des zugrunde liegenden Modells und
den daraus resultierenden Auswirkungen auf das Imitations-LZG. Anderer-
seits simulieren wir den Markov Prozess mit positiven Mutationsraten und
betrachten die Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilungen u¨ber dem Zustandsraum.
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